Independent Foreign Policy: Defence, Not Foreign Wars

Independent foreign policy.

Quick Answer

Australia should be able to defend its territory, protect its people, and resolve disputes through diplomacy without automatically adopting the United States’ military objectives. That requires examining why powerful states intervene abroad, how resources and business interests sometimes shape strategy, and whether the UN Security Council can act impartially when five countries hold veto powers.

Historical examples differ: the Korean War followed an invasion and UN recommendation, while the CIA-backed overthrow of governments in Iran and Guatemala raises distinct questions about sovereignty and economic interests. The practical Australian test is independent decision-making, credible self-defence, parliamentary scrutiny and consistent respect for international law.

Australia needs its own foreign policy, not another nation’s wars

What should Australia do when a powerful ally launches a war that has little connection to defending our country? That is a serious question for anyone who wants both national security and a peaceful future for their children and grandchildren.

Australia has repeatedly participated in US-led conflicts. The governments that made those decisions offered different reasons in different eras, and we cannot treat the conflicts as identical. But the recurring pattern makes it reasonable to examine the limits of our independence.

Our editorial position is that Australia should define security first as the protection of its people, territory, democratic institutions and regional relationships. It should reject the idea that loyalty to an ally requires joining offensive or poorly justified military operations. This is an argument for self-defence backed by serious diplomacy, not for leaving Australians defenceless.

The distinction matters. A nation can own advanced weapons yet still lack genuine strategic autonomy if its intelligence, maintenance, operational access and political decisions depend heavily on a foreign power.

Why has the United States acted as a global policeman?

After 1945, the United States built a worldwide security network of alliances, bases, naval power and intelligence relationships. American governments defended this posture as a means of deterring attacks, protecting allies, maintaining access to trade routes and containing Soviet influence. Supporters see it as a contribution to international stability. Critics argue that a power able to intervene far from home is also tempted to define other countries’ internal political choices as threats to its own interests.

The distinction matters for Australia. A foreign crisis can be strategically important without posing an imminent threat to Australian territory or people. Decisions to send troops should therefore distinguish national self-defence, assistance requested by a state under attack, Security Council-authorised collective action and discretionary operations designed to reshape another country’s government.

The Korean War does not settle the wider argument

In June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Security Council Resolution 83 recommended that UN members help repel the attack. The United States led the multinational response, while the Soviet Union was absent from the Council vote. This was not a case of North Korea attacking the American mainland; it was presented as collective security in response to aggression against South Korea. That legal and historical context should be recognised even by people who question subsequent American military strategy. [11]

The controversy is broader than whether Washington itself was threatened. A legitimate collective-security response does not confer a standing right to intervene anywhere, and individual operations still raise questions about proportionality, civilian protection, escalation and political objectives. Australia needs to ask those questions independently rather than accepting a blanket narrative that every US-led war is either necessary or predatory.

Security responsibilities are not a licence for regime change

Under the UN Charter, states generally must not use force against another state’s territorial integrity or political independence. The Charter recognises self-defence after an armed attack and permits Security Council action under its powers. Outside those frameworks, claims of global policing cannot themselves establish the legality of a war. International law also requires attention to how force is used, including protection of civilians. [3]

The record of US military intervention deserves scrutiny

Iran in 1953: oil, power and the overthrow of a government

Iran provides a documented example of foreign interference in a country’s political direction. In 1953, US and British intelligence supported the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh after a confrontation involving oil nationalisation, British commercial interests and Cold War fears. Declassified CIA records acknowledge the agency’s role in planning and carrying out the coup. Historians debate the relative weight of oil, anticommunism and other strategic concerns; what is not seriously in doubt is that outside powers helped remove Iran’s government. [12]

Australians should insist that publicly stated security justifications be tested against any parallel economic or geopolitical interests.

Guatemala in 1954: corporate interests and covert intervention

In Guatemala, President Jacobo Árbenz’s land reforms challenged powerful interests including the United Fruit Company. Official US foreign-relations records document backing for prospective anti-government forces from the company and regional governments. Declassified CIA records also reveal planning connected with the operation against Árbenz, including consideration of assassination. Anticommunism featured prominently in US decision-making, alongside disputes over land and business interests. [13] [14]

Guatemala is especially relevant to the claim that US policy sometimes defended an economic order favourable to American corporations.

Vietnam: containment, credibility and devastating consequences

The US escalation in Vietnam was publicly justified through the Cold War policy of containing communism and commitments to South Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers, a major internal Defence Department history later released by the US National Archives, allow the public to examine how successive administrations assessed the conflict and the consequences of their choices. The war became a prolonged and destructive conflict with enormous civilian suffering. [15]

Vietnam invites a question that is relevant today: when leaders describe the credibility of an alliance as a reason to continue fighting, how are the interests of the people living in the war zone and those of countries such as Australia independently assessed?

Iraq shows the consequences of an avoidable war

The 2003 invasion of Iraq remains a defining example. The United Kingdom’s official Iraq Inquiry concluded in 2016 that military action had been taken before peaceful options were exhausted. It also found serious problems with the assessment of weapons intelligence and planning for the aftermath. Australia joined the US-led invasion, and Australians are entitled to ask what independent safeguards operated before that decision.

The inquiry did not itself determine the legality of UK participation. Its findings nevertheless give a powerful warning about the dangers of overstated certainty and diplomatic options being set aside. UK Parliamentary Library analysis

The human costs extend far beyond battlefields

Brown University’s Costs of War project estimates that post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and related areas caused more than 940,000 direct violent deaths between 2001 and 2023, with additional indirect deaths estimated at 3.6 to 3.8 million. These are estimates across multiple conflicts involving many armed actors, not a count of deaths solely caused by US forces. They nevertheless convey the human scale of prolonged warfare.

Brown University human costs research

US governments and defenders of these operations point to counterterrorism, deterrence, protection of allies and responses to genuine threats. Those concerns cannot simply be dismissed. But claimed intentions must be tested against evidence of civilian harm, legality, escalation, reconstruction failures and the outcomes people actually experience. Criticism of US military policy need not imply hostility to Americans, including service personnel and families who have also borne enormous costs.

Military strategy, natural resources and corporate power

Oil, mineral supply chains, shipping routes, overseas investments and defence contracts can all influence the strategic environment in which decisions are made. It is legitimate to investigate who stood to gain from an intervention and whether decision-makers had close relationships with relevant industries. But profit following a war is not, by itself, proof that profit caused the war. Causation requires evidence from official planning documents, correspondence, decision records and credible historical research.

The 2003 Iraq invasion illustrates the value of this distinction. Oil and the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf were part of the region’s geopolitical context, but claims that oil was the sole or proven motive for the invasion go beyond what the Iraq Inquiry established. The inquiry did establish that military action occurred before peaceful options had been exhausted and that serious risks were inadequately handled. Those findings alone warrant scrutiny of Australia’s participation. [1] [16]

For future conflicts, Australia should publish a publicly intelligible assessment of strategic objectives, international-law authority, civilian risks, projected costs and potential commercial beneficiaries. Parliamentary committees should have the means to examine defence contractors and conflicts of interest without prejudging the outcome.

Can the United Nations act independently of powerful states?

The Security Council veto is a structural limit

The United Nations is not simply controlled by the United States. The General Assembly includes all UN member states, and countries routinely disagree with Washington. But the Security Council is structurally unequal: the United States, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom can each veto substantive resolutions. A negative vote from any one of them can prevent action even when most other Council members support it. [17]

This can protect a permanent member or its partners from unwanted Council decisions, and it can prevent a collective response to serious abuses. The same objection applies whether the veto is used by Washington, Moscow or Beijing. The 1950 Korea resolution is a reminder that Council outcomes also depend on the political circumstances of the vote, including the Soviet absence on that occasion. [11]

What reform could Australia support?

Possible changes include expanding representation for currently under-represented regions, improving transparency around proposed vetoes, stronger General Assembly scrutiny and voluntary restraint on veto use in situations involving mass atrocities. Negotiations over Security Council reform have been under way for years; changing the Charter’s rules remains politically difficult. Australia can nevertheless advocate reforms consistently and support diplomatic processes that do not depend entirely on one great power’s preferred outcome. [18]

UN reform would not abolish power politics or guarantee peace. It would, however, make it harder to confuse the wishes of a few permanent members with the judgement of the international community as a whole.

What an independent Australian foreign policy would mean

Independence does not require refusing every agreement with the United States, China or any other country. It means Australia can say yes, no or propose an alternative without treating another government’s objectives as automatically our own.

Australia should assess each proposed military involvement against a published set of questions: Is Australia or an ally facing an armed attack? What is the lawful basis for force? Have peaceful options genuinely been pursued? What are the likely civilian consequences? Who makes the operational decisions, and how could Australia withdraw?

The United Nations Charter obliges states to settle disputes by peaceful means and generally prohibits threats or uses of force against another state. It recognises individual and collective self-defence in Article 51 when an armed attack occurs, alongside the powers of the UN Security Council. A rules-based position therefore means applying the same legal standards to allies and rivals alike.

United Nations Charter

Defending Australia is different from projecting power abroad

Build a military designed for credible self-defence

Australia faces genuine defence responsibilities: safeguarding its population, northern approaches, sea and air access, communications, energy networks, undersea connections and emergency supplies. A force organised around these tasks would need surveillance, coastal and air defence, resilient cyber systems, logistics, trained personnel and enough domestic maintenance capacity to operate during a crisis.

This need not mean abandoning partners or pretending that geography makes us invulnerable. It means judging equipment by whether it improves Australia’s actual ability to deter attack, survive disruption and defend its immediate region, rather than by how seamlessly it participates in distant US campaigns.

There is an important opening in official policy. The 2026 National Defence Strategy defines self-reliance partly as the ability to defend Australia when allied assistance may be limited. But the same strategy also emphasises partner integration. The question for public scrutiny is how these priorities are balanced in real budgets, operations and capabilities.

What about AUKUS and joint facilities?

Supporters of AUKUS argue that nuclear-powered submarines, technology access and cooperation with the United States and United Kingdom will strengthen deterrence. Critics question cost, delivery risks, strategic dependence and whether the arrangements could encourage involvement in a confrontation not chosen by Australians.

These are not abstract questions. Defence ministers reaffirmed AUKUS in May 2026, and in October 2026 announced the first submarine assigned to Submarine Rotational Force–West for 2027. Such arrangements require public explanation of Australian command authority, operational permissions, maintenance dependencies and how access would be handled if Australia refused to support a particular conflict.

Defence ministers AUKUS statement  |  October 2026 rotational force statement

The case for reviewing US access and joint facilities has been developed separately in our article

End US Military Basing in Australia. Here the narrower test is whether Australia can independently authorise, monitor and refuse participation in any operation conducted from its territory.

Diplomacy should be a central instrument of national security

Diplomacy is sometimes presented as an alternative to preparing for conflict. In practice, effective diplomacy works best when a country has credible defensive capacity and a reputation for acting consistently. Maintaining communication with countries whose policies we oppose does not mean we agree with their actions. Diplomacy allows countries to resolve disagreements peacefully and helps prevent misunderstandings from escalating into conflict or war.

Strengthen regional relationships beyond great-power rivalry

Australia’s first diplomatic priority should be sustained relationships with Pacific Island countries, Indonesia, Southeast Asia, India, Japan and other regional partners. These countries have their own interests and should not be treated merely as pieces in a contest between Washington and Beijing.

Cooperation on fisheries, maritime safety, climate adaptation, trade, disaster relief, disease prevention and educational exchanges can build trust that military procurement alone cannot buy. It is especially important to listen when Pacific neighbours identify climate change and development as security priorities.

Maintain dialogue with China without abandoning principles

China is Australia’s largest trading partner and a major influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Maintaining a constructive relationship with China is important for Australia’s economic prosperity, regional stability and national security.

An independent Australian foreign policy should prioritise respectful dialogue, mutually beneficial trade and peaceful cooperation. Differences between governments should be addressed through diplomacy rather than confrontation or military threats.

Australia should make its own decisions about its relationship with China, based on Australian interests, international law and the shared benefits of regional peace, rather than automatically adopting the strategic priorities of the United States.

Practical measures could include crisis communication, maritime incident-prevention arrangements, renewed arms-control engagement and support for regional forums that include countries with competing interests. The purpose is not to guarantee friendship. It is to reduce the chance of miscalculation and preserve room for peaceful resolution.

Use international law consistently

Australia should support independent investigation of alleged violations of international humanitarian law regardless of who is accused. Human rights and civilian protection lose credibility when governments apply them selectively. Negotiation, mediation, humanitarian assistance and accountable peacekeeping can be substantive contributions to security, not symbolic substitutes for it.

A self-defence and diplomacy test for every overseas conflict

Before Australia supports a foreign military operation, the government should answer six public questions. What immediate threat exists to Australia or a partner? Has the affected state requested lawful assistance, or has the Security Council authorised action? What diplomatic alternatives have been attempted? What does independent intelligence actually establish? How will civilians be protected, and what conditions would end the mission? What economic, strategic or corporate interests might create pressure to participate?

The answers should be judged on their own merits. Supporting an ally subjected to armed attack is different from participating in preventive war or regime change; humanitarian concerns may be genuine even when military proposals are ineffective or unlawful. Saying no to one operation need not mean abandoning defence cooperation, disaster relief or negotiated peace initiatives.

Who should decide when Australians go to war?

Under Australia’s current arrangements, the executive government holds the decision-making power to deploy the Australian Defence Force into armed conflict. A 2023 parliamentary inquiry examined the issue, and a government memorandum describes how Parliament should be informed after major overseas deployment decisions. Parliamentary notification is not the same as a prior parliamentary vote.

Parliamentary inquiry  |  PM&C memorandum

A practical reform would require an early parliamentary debate and, except where immediate action is essential to defend Australia or protect lives, a vote before committing forces to major overseas hostilities. The government should publish an unclassified statement of objectives, legal basis, anticipated costs, civilian risks and an exit plan. Classified material could be reviewed through secure parliamentary processes.

Such oversight would not remove hard choices. Governments may need to act quickly, and intelligence cannot all be public. But urgency should be a carefully defined exception, not an excuse for keeping representatives and citizens outside the decision.

What do Australians think about the alliance?

Australians are not united behind a simple pro-US or anti-US position. In the 2026 Lowy Institute Poll, 73 per cent considered the US alliance important to Australian security, while only 31 per cent trusted the United States to act responsibly in the world. The poll also reported 68 per cent support for AUKUS. These different responses show that confidence in a security relationship need not equal approval of every US action.

2026 Lowy Institute Poll

An honest debate must therefore consider the benefits many Australians see in allied intelligence and deterrence as well as the risks of dependence, unnecessary war and weak democratic scrutiny. Polls measure views at a point in time. They do not settle whether a particular deployment or weapons program is justified.

Defence choices also affect everyday Australian life

Military expenditure and public services draw on overlapping pools of engineers, technicians, skilled trades, construction capacity, imported equipment and government attention. A defence project does not automatically subtract a fixed amount from hospital or housing spending, but large competing projects can make workers and materials harder to obtain.

Australia issues its own floating currency, so Commonwealth finances are not the same as a household budget. Dollar sovereignty gives the federal government policy options, but it does not conjure nurses, tradespeople, ships or imported components into existence. Inflation, scarce skills, productive capacity and environmental limits remain real constraints.

A serious national security debate should compare the full public value of investments. Secure housing, strong health services, resilient energy networks, emergency response and climate adaptation can also make a country harder to disrupt. A society’s wellbeing is part of its security, not an afterthought.

What independence would mean in practice for Australia

A national defence force should be able to maintain awareness of Australia’s maritime approaches, protect essential infrastructure, deter coercion, and respond to attacks or disasters. It should also have reliable logistics and maintenance that do not depend on immediate foreign rescue. These capacities require long-term investment and careful cooperation with neighbours, not a claim that Australia can be completely self-sufficient.

Diplomacy requires the same seriousness: permanent regional relationships, specialist language and negotiation skills, stable development partnerships, support for disarmament processes and credible channels to countries with which Australia disagrees. Reducing the chance of war is a measurable national interest, not an afterthought to military procurement.

A practical agenda for independent security and peace

  • Require an independent assessment of the legal basis, strategic necessity and credible non-military alternatives before joining any US-led or other overseas operation.
  • Disclose and scrutinise potential economic beneficiaries of conflicts, including defence contractors, major resource interests and other relevant corporate relationships.
  • Advocate consistent limits on Security Council veto use and stronger representation, transparency and General Assembly oversight.
  • Publish an independent foreign policy statement identifying the circumstances in which Australia would use force and the diplomatic steps required beforehand.
  • Require meaningful parliamentary scrutiny of major overseas deployments, with tightly defined emergency exceptions and regular reviews.
  • Audit foreign military access, joint facilities and AUKUS dependencies, then publish as much as security permits about Australian consent and operational control.
  • Prioritise territorial protection, regional maritime awareness, cyber resilience, domestic maintenance and supply-chain reliability in defence planning.
  • Expand professional diplomatic capacity, conflict prevention, regional development cooperation and humanitarian response, particularly in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
  • Apply international law and civilian-protection standards consistently to allies and competitors, and publish independent evaluations of major operations.
  • Assess defence projects alongside housing, health, infrastructure and climate resilience using transparent whole-of-life costs and actual resource constraints.

Each reform would need legislation, funding, skilled personnel or negotiated changes to existing arrangements. Withdrawal from particular partnerships could carry costs and require years of transition. Those are reasons to undertake rigorous public assessment, not reasons to put the question beyond debate.

Conclusion: Australia Must Have the Independence to Say No to War

Australia’s involvement in US-led military operations raises fundamental questions about national sovereignty, international law and whose interests are being served. The historical record of American interventions in Iran, Guatemala, Vietnam and Iraq demonstrates how military power, political influence, strategic ambitions and economic interests have shaped the affairs of other nations, often with devastating consequences for their populations.

Australia should not automatically accept the United States’ interpretation of international threats or participate in military operations simply because Washington expects its support. Our defence forces should exist primarily to protect Australia, not advance the geopolitical or commercial interests of another country.

A genuinely independent foreign policy would place greater emphasis on peaceful diplomacy, international cooperation, mutual respect and constructive relationships with all nations, including China. China’s growing economic influence and diplomatic initiatives demonstrate the importance of considering alternatives to military confrontation.

Australia has the resources, institutions and diplomatic opportunities to pursue its own course. Its dollar sovereignty also provides the capacity to support public investment in national resilience, subject to the availability of real resources.

True national security is not measured by how closely Australia follows a powerful ally, but by its ability to defend its territory, maintain peaceful international relationships and make decisions that genuinely serve the Australian people.

Above all, Australia must retain the independence to say no to war and the determination to pursue peace.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does ANZUS require Australia to join US wars?

No. ANZUS does not automatically require Australian participation in each US conflict. Australia’s government must make its own decisions through its constitutional processes.

Does independent foreign policy mean abolishing the Defence Force?

No. A self-defence policy requires credible capability to protect Australia, deter coercion and respond to emergencies. The debate concerns priorities, missions and decision-making authority.

Is diplomacy enough to prevent a military attack?

Not always. Diplomacy can reduce misunderstanding and find peaceful solutions, but it cannot eliminate every threat. Defensive readiness, regional cooperation and conflict prevention serve different, complementary purposes.

Can Australia disagree with the US and remain a partner?

Yes. Cooperation does not remove Australia’s legal power to make separate decisions. The harder question is whether operational dependencies make disagreement costly or difficult in practice.

Would spending less on foreign wars automatically fund housing?

No. Budget choices must still be authorised, and trained workers and materials may not be immediately transferable. Redirecting priorities can create opportunities, but the real resources and timing must be planned.

Does the United States control the United Nations?

No. The United States is influential but does not control the entire UN. It does hold one of five Security Council vetoes, which can block substantive Council action. Other permanent members have the same power.

Have all US wars been fought for resources or corporations?

That sweeping claim is not established. Certain interventions, including the 1953 Iran coup and the 1954 Guatemala operation, have strong documentary links to political and economic interests. Other conflicts have distinct circumstances, including collective responses to invasions.

Join the discussion

Where should Australia draw the line between defending its own people and participating in military operations overseas? We welcome evidence, personal experience and respectful disagreement.

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Sources

  1. UK House of Commons Library. Chilcot Inquiry and Parliamentary Accountability (2016). https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cdp-2016-0235/
  2. Brown University, Costs of War. Human Costs of Post-9/11 Wars (data 2001–2023). https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/costs/human
  3. United Nations. Charter of the United Nations, Articles 2, 33 and 51 (1945). https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text
  4. Australian Department of Defence. AUKUS Advanced Capabilities (2026). https://www.defence.gov.au/defence-activities/programs-initiatives/aukus-advanced-capabilities
  5. Australian Defence Ministers. Joint Statement, AUKUS Defence Ministers Meeting (30 May 2026). https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2026-05-30/joint-statement-aukus-defence-ministers-meeting
  6. Australian Defence Ministers. Submarine Rotational Force–West statement (27 October 2026). https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2026-10-27/joint-statement-uss-colorado-ssn-788-announced-first-submarine-submarine-rotational-force-west
  7. Parliament of Australia. Inquiry into international armed conflict decision making, Chapter 2 (2023). https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Armedconflict/Report/Chapter_2_-_The_source_nature_and_exercise_of_power_regarding_armed_conflict_and_war
  8. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Memorandum on Government Conventions Relating to Overseas Armed Conflict Decision Making. https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/memorandum-government-conventions-armed-conflict
  9. Lowy Institute. 2026 Lowy Institute Poll (22 June 2026). https://www.lowyinstitute.org/newsroom/2026-lowy-institute-poll-australians-trust-in-the-united-states-hits-record-low-as-economic-pessimism-surges
  10. Australian Department of Defence. 2026 National Defence Strategy, self-reliance summary (2026). https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-04/2026%20NDS%20Overview_factsheet_WEB.pdf
  11. United Nations Security Council. Resolution 83, assistance to the Republic of Korea (27 June 1950). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112026/
  12. National Security Archive, George Washington University. CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup (19 August 2013). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/
  13. US Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala, editorial note. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54Guat/d1
  14. National Security Archive, George Washington University. CIA and Assassinations: The Guatemala 1954 Documents. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/index.html
  15. US National Archives. Pentagon Papers, released in full in 2011. https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers
  16. UK Cabinet Office and Iraq Inquiry. The Report of the Iraq Inquiry (6 July 2016). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry
  17. United Nations Security Council. Voting System and the Right to Veto. https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/voting-system
  18. United Nations General Assembly. Reform of the Security Council, intergovernmental negotiations. https://www.un.org/en/ga/screform/

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