Australia should end US military basing and operational access on its soil. It should close joint military and intelligence facilities to US operations, remove American military stores and rotational deployments, and develop a defence force able to protect Australia under independent Australian direction.
That is the editorial position advanced here. It rests on a serious concern: facilities that support American military operations can expose Australians to the consequences of wars our country might otherwise avoid.
The United States does not have to threaten Australia directly for its presence here to create danger. The central question is whether Australians should accept that exposure as the continuing price of the alliance or undertake a planned withdrawal and build a more independent defence policy.
Quick Answer
Australia should negotiate an end to US military basing, joint operational facilities and standing military access, while building the capabilities needed for independent national defence. Hosting American combat support can create exposure to retaliation and make staying out of a US war harder. Governments argue that the alliance provides deterrence, intelligence and advanced technology; withdrawal would require managing the loss or reduction of those benefits. The strongest case for ending the presence combines a clear policy decision with lawful treaty processes, practical replacement of essential capabilities, worker support and environmental responsibility. It does not require claiming that war is inevitable.
What ending US military basing in Australia means
The policy must cover what foreign forces can do here, wherever those activities occur.
The Department of Defence’s force posture overview describes northern base upgrades, expanding cooperation, and plans for prepositioned fuel, munitions and equipment. Prepositioning places supplies where a force may need them before a crisis begins.
Ending this presence would mean withdrawing permission for continuing American deployments and military operations. At jointly operated facilities, including Pine Gap, it would mean ending US military and intelligence operations. At Australian bases, it would mean ending US operational access while retaining facilities Australia needs for its own defence.
Changing the sign on a gate would achieve little if the same foreign military functions continued. A withdrawal policy should address personnel, contractors performing military functions, equipment, communications and operational arrangements.
The government’s description of sovereignty arrangements distinguishes rotational access and joint facilities from foreign bases. Those distinctions matter legally. The proposed policy would end the operational presence across those categories, rather than depend on a particular label.
Australia could retain civilian scientific exchanges, trade and diplomatic relations. Decisions about short humanitarian visits would remain separate from granting a foreign military an enduring operating presence.
How the US presence can expose Australians to war
A military campaign relies on support systems. Aircraft need fuel and repairs. Ships need maintenance and supplies. Commanders need communications and intelligence.
Consider a hypothetical US–China war. Canberra declines to deploy Australian combat forces, but facilities here continue supporting American operations. An opponent could consider disabling those facilities useful to its campaign.
The danger arises from their military contribution. It does not depend solely on whether Australia has announced that it is joining the war.
The International Committee of the Red Cross explains that a military objective must contribute effectively to military action and offer a definite military advantage if destroyed or neutralised. Civilian protection, proportionality and precautions remain legal requirements. A military role does not give another country a general legal entitlement to attack Australia or surrounding communities.
Whether an attack would occur depends on the particular conflict, military decisions and risks of escalation. Ending US access would remove one pathway of exposure; it would not eliminate every threat to Australia.
For communities near military facilities, the consequences could extend well beyond the installation itself. Emergency planning must consider possible disruption to transport, communications, health services and essential supplies. Residents deserve a voice in decisions that could increase those risks.
Expansion makes the choice more urgent
Australia is making arrangements whose consequences extend far beyond the current parliamentary term.
On 27 October 2026, the AUKUS partners designated USS Colorado as the first US submarine assigned to Submarine Rotational Force–West, beginning in late 2027. The planned rotation at HMAS Stirling could host up to four US submarines and one British submarine.
These are planned deployments, rather than a force already operating at that scale. Their significance is that Australian facilities would provide an enduring base of support for visiting foreign submarines.
The Australian Submarine Agency’s international agreements overview explains how AUKUS cooperation enables transfers of nuclear propulsion information, material and equipment. It also links that cooperation to preparing for the foreign submarine rotation.
Australia’s proposed submarines are conventionally armed and nuclear-powered. The argument for withdrawal concerns military operations and dependence; it does not rely on treating nuclear propulsion as proof of nuclear armament.
A policy to end US military basing should therefore include cancelling the planned foreign submarine rotation and reviewing AUKUS commitments that would perpetuate the same operational dependence. Substituting another foreign force for the American presence would leave the underlying sovereignty question unresolved.
SJA’s earlier article on the human and environmental costs of US military bases examines wider harms. The focus here is the policy choice to end the presence and the transition needed to make that choice credible.
Why approval safeguards are insufficient
The government maintains that Australia controls decisions about entering war and allowing its territory to support armed conflict.
In his February 2023 sovereignty statement, Defence Minister Richard Marles explained that “full knowledge and concurrence” involves agreement to purposes, capabilities and expected outcomes. It does not require Australia to approve every individual activity separately.
That raises a practical problem. During a fast-moving crisis, broad cooperation can become support for a specific campaign. Governments may face requests for assistance against a background of forces already present, supplies already positioned and systems already integrated.
Ashley Townshend’s 2023 Carnegie analysis discusses possible requests for refuelling, fighter escorts and targeting support in a confrontation with China. Although he advocates stronger cooperation, he recognises that the two governments could assess escalation risks differently and have little time to deliberate.
Better approval rules could reduce risk while withdrawal proceeds. But they would leave the operating infrastructure and pressures for cooperation in place.
Our judgement is that Australia should remove this source of entanglement through withdrawal. That is a policy conclusion drawn from the risks, not a claim that every request must be approved or that war is automatic.
Why governments support arrangements that create dependence
Successive governments view the alliance as a way to obtain security benefits Australia would struggle to provide alone.
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade identifies intelligence, advanced technology, military capability and training among those benefits. In September 2026, Marles defended expanding American force posture as supporting deterrence, stability and peace.
These stated reasons help explain policy. Accusations that ministers simply want to betray Australia would substitute speculation for analysis.
A more useful criticism concerns the dependence created by the choices themselves. Equipment can require foreign parts, software, specialist training and maintenance. As these dependencies grow, maintaining the relationship may appear easier than developing alternatives.
Official records also show the importance attached to reassuring Washington. Parliament’s 2014 treaty committee report recorded concern that failing to implement the Force Posture Agreement could undermine the alliance and be interpreted as reduced Australian commitment.
That reasoning can make independence harder to exercise. A refusal may be evaluated partly through its possible effect on the relationship, even when the proposed activity deserves rejection on its own merits.
Richard Tanter’s September 2026 research on US access to Australian facilities reinforces the importance of examining operational access alongside legal ownership. The public needs to know what Australia gains, what it depends on and what freedom it retains.
The strongest argument against withdrawal deserves an answer
Alliance supporters argue that American power discourages aggression and that access to US intelligence and technology strengthens Australian defence. Withdrawal could reduce that access, damage military cooperation and require substantial investment in replacements.
Those consequences should be assessed openly. It would be irresponsible to assume that every existing capability could be replaced quickly, cheaply or at equal quality.
The case for withdrawal nevertheless remains persuasive: a defence relationship should be judged against the security it delivers for Australians, including the exposure it creates through foreign operations.
SJA gives greater weight to reducing entanglement and restoring practical freedom of action. That judgement also places a responsibility on advocates of withdrawal. We must explain how Australia would protect itself through the transition and publish the costs and limitations of the alternatives.
A phased withdrawal allows essential Australian capabilities to be sustained while new arrangements are developed. It needs firm milestones so that preparation does not become an excuse for indefinite delay.
Ending the presence requires several legal processes
Australia has legal pathways to change its commitments.
Article XXI of the 2014 Force Posture Agreement permits either party to terminate it on one year’s written notice. The agreement also provides for amendment by mutual agreement. Termination does not extinguish specified obligations relating to matters such as costs, claims and classified information.
That clause is a concrete starting point, not a single notice that closes every US-linked facility. Separate arrangements govern other activities. DFAT’s account of the Harold E. Holt station identifies a distinct treaty governing US access and joint use. Pine Gap also has its own treaty history, while AUKUS involves additional instruments.
The government should publish a legal inventory identifying the current instruments, notice periods, surviving obligations and responsibilities for each activity. Sensitive technical details can remain protected while Parliament examines the legal basis for withdrawal.
The objective should be announced immediately. Implementation should use the applicable treaty processes and negotiated arrangements, supported by a public timetable. A firm endpoint and lawful administration belong together.
A practical plan for removing US military facilities
A credible withdrawal policy should contain six linked commitments.
Stop expanding the commitment
Announce that Australia will end US military basing and standing operational access. Decline new access arrangements and negotiate a halt to further expansion under existing commitments. Cancel preparations for new foreign rotations through the relevant legal and contractual processes.
This would establish the direction of policy before further investments create additional pressure to continue.
Issue notices and negotiate departure
Use the Force Posture Agreement’s termination mechanism and address the other relevant instruments separately. Set deadlines for withdrawing US personnel and military stores, ending contractor-operated military functions and closing joint operations.
During the notice periods, negotiate restrictions on support for foreign combat campaigns and require explicit Australian decisions on any proposed change of purpose.
Replace essential capabilities before they are lost
Audit the intelligence, communications, maintenance and supply functions Australia relies on. Identify which are essential to national defence, which can be replaced and which risks Australia would accept.
Develop Australian-controlled alternatives, including domestic skills, spare parts, diversified suppliers and independent analysis. Publish enough of the assessment to allow scrutiny of the transition’s cost and credibility.
Protect workers and surrounding communities
Consult employees, local businesses, state and territory governments, and Traditional Owners before closures or transfers. Provide retraining and employment support where jobs would be affected.
Useful infrastructure could be retained for Australian defence or assessed for civilian uses. A transition fund could support locally chosen projects, with decisions based on community needs and viable employment opportunities.
Settle cleanup and safety responsibilities
Commission independent assessments of land, water, fuel infrastructure and other hazards. Determine responsibility for existing contamination from evidence and the applicable agreements.
Negotiate enforceable arrangements for removal, remediation and continuing monitoring. Any hazardous or nuclear-related material must be managed under the relevant safety requirements. Withdrawal should leave communities with clear responsibilities and funded work, rather than unresolved disputes.
Report progress to Parliament
Require regular reports on notices, departures, capability replacement, costs and site restoration. Give an appropriately cleared oversight body access to confidential arrangements.
The public should be able to judge whether the government is meeting its commitments. Delays should require explanation, a revised plan and continuing scrutiny.
Independent defence must focus on protecting Australia
Australia should design its armed forces around defending its people, territory, maritime approaches and essential infrastructure. Procurement and operational planning should follow that purpose.
Priorities could include surveillance, air and maritime defence, cyber security, resilient communications, domestic maintenance and reliable supplies. Diplomacy and regional cooperation should work alongside those capabilities to reduce the risk of conflict.
Military independence requires Australian control over decisions and a realistic ability to sustain essential operations. Complete industrial self-sufficiency in every component may be impractical. Procurement should therefore disclose critical dependencies and provide plans for managing them.
Australia can maintain respectful relations with the United States while ending its military operating presence. Cooperation on trade, education, science and civilian emergencies need not confer an enduring right to support combat operations from Australian territory.
Removing bases would not automatically end ANZUS. The DFAT country brief describes that treaty’s consultation and common-danger framework. Australia should separately review alliance obligations against the goal of an independent, defensively focused policy.
Australia can invest in the transition
Australia issues its own currency and operates a floating exchange rate. The Commonwealth’s financial capacity differs from that of households and state governments.
Deakin University’s explanation of federal spending describes currency creation and the importance of real resources. Monetary sovereignty provides scope for public investment in domestic defence skills, civilian infrastructure, worker transitions and diplomacy.
The constraints remain substantial. Australia needs trained people, productive capacity, materials and access to technology. Imported equipment depends on willing suppliers and exchange rates. Spending that outstrips available resources can add to inflation.
The government should therefore plan the workforce and production required for independence. The question is whether Australia can develop and obtain what it needs, on a timetable that protects national security and supports affected communities.
Australians should decide the terms of their security
The government’s memorandum on overseas armed conflict decisions preserves executive authority to deploy the Australian Defence Force. It provides for parliamentary statements and debate within 30 days of a major overseas combat deployment, rather than requiring prior parliamentary approval.
Australia needs stronger democratic control over both overseas deployments and foreign military operations supported from its territory. During withdrawal, Parliament should scrutinise substantial support for foreign combat campaigns, with carefully defined emergency provisions.
Citizens can ask federal representatives to support a published withdrawal plan. Useful questions concern the legal notices, the capabilities needing replacement, protection for workers and the timetable for ending foreign operations.
These requests should seek evidence and commitments that can be checked. An inquiry should help implement the decision and resolve practical problems, rather than endlessly reopen whether Australians are entitled to change their defence policy.
The case for ending the US military presence
Australia should end US military basing, close joint facilities to American military and intelligence operations, and withdraw continuing permission for US operational access.
The evidence establishes expanding cooperation, meaningful dependence and credible pathways through which foreign operations could expose Australia to conflict. It does not establish that an attack is inevitable or precisely measure how withdrawal would change the overall risk.
The policy judgement is ours to make. We believe Australians would be better served by reducing this exposure and building an independent, defensively focused military supported by active diplomacy.
A planned withdrawal would involve costs and difficult decisions. Governments should explain and manage them. Continuing to deepen dependence also involves choices, costs and risks, for which Australians deserve full accountability.
Frequently Asked Questions
Would ending US basing close Australian defence bases
Australian bases could remain in service for Australian defence. The policy would end US military operations and access rights, and close or repurpose joint facilities as required.
Can every US linked facility be closed through one agreement
No. The Force Posture Agreement, facility-specific arrangements and AUKUS instruments must be addressed separately. A legal inventory is needed to establish the processes and timetable.
Would withdrawal guarantee that Australia could avoid war
No. It would remove a pathway of involvement through hosting US operations. Australia would still need defence capabilities, diplomacy and resilience against other risks.
What would happen to intelligence Australia receives
Access could be reduced or changed. The government would need to assess essential functions, develop alternatives and explain any remaining gaps. Withdrawal should include a funded intelligence transition.
Does ending US basing mean hostility towards Americans
No. Australia can maintain civilian relationships while deciding that a foreign military operating presence does not serve its security. The proposed change concerns government policy and military arrangements.
Join the discussion
How should Australia balance the risks of hosting foreign military operations against the costs and uncertainties of a more independent defence policy?
Share your evidence and views, including respectful disagreement or corrections. Explore our Foreign Policy and Peace coverage, share this article, and ask your representatives what a credible withdrawal plan would require.
If you believe in what we are trying to achieve, your support can help Social Justice Australia continue producing independent public-interest analysis. Every contribution, large or small, is appreciated. Visit Support Us to learn how you can help.
Authoritative Sources
- Australian Department of Defence. United States Force Posture Initiatives. Current program overview, accessed 3 November 2026.
- AUKUS defence ministers. Joint Statement, USS Colorado (SSN 788) Announced as First Submarine for Submarine Rotational Force – West. 27 October 2026.
- International Committee of the Red Cross. Methods and means of warfare. Current legal overview, accessed 3 November 2026.
- Richard Marles, Australian Minister for Defence. Securing Australia’s Sovereignty. 9 February 2023.
- Governments of Australia and the United States. The Force Posture Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America. Signed 12 August 2014; Article XXI.
- Ashley Townshend, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. How to Manage the Risks and Requirements of U.S.-Australia Force Posture Cooperation. 20 October 2023.
- Richard Tanter, Nautilus Institute. ‘Location, Location, Location’: US Access to Australian Defence Facilities. 18 September 2026.
- Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. United States of America country brief. Current country brief, accessed 3 November 2026.
- Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. Report 145, Chapter 2, The Force Posture Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America. 2014; especially paragraph 2.6.
- Richard Marles, Australian Minister for Defence. Doorstop, Washington DC. 2 September 2026.
- Australian Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Memorandum on Government Conventions Relating to Overseas Armed Conflict Decision Making. Released 27 November 2024.
- Reserve Bank of Australia. The Exchange Rate and the Reserve Bank’s Role in the Foreign Exchange Market. Current explainer, accessed 3 November 2026.
- Deakin University. Where does the federal government’s money come from?. Explanation featuring researcher Matthew Crocker; accessed 3 November 2026.
- Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Australia-United States: Exchange of letters relating to Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station AUSMIN 2010. Updated 18 September 2014.
- Australian Submarine Agency. International agreements. Current overview of naval nuclear propulsion cooperation, accessed 3 November 2026.
#AustralianSovereignty #IndependentDefence #PeaceAndSecurity #SocialJusticeAustralia